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Abstract
Many emerging Web services, such as email, photo
sharing, and web site archives, need to preserve large
amounts of quickly-accessible data indefinitely into the
future. In this paper, we make the case that these applica-
tions’ demands on large scale storage systems over long
time horizons require us to re-evaluate traditional stor-
age system designs. We examine threats to long-lived
data from an end-to-end perspective, taking into account
not just hardware and software faults but also faults due
to humans and organizations. We present a simple model
of long-term storage failures that helps us reason about
the various strategies for addressing these threats in a
cost-effective manner. Using this model we show that the
most important strategies for increasing the reliability of
long-term storage are detecting latent faults quickly, au-
tomating fault repair to make it faster and cheaper, and
increasing the independence of data replicas.
1 Introduction
Frequent headlines remind us that bits, even bits stored
in expensive, professionally administered data centers,
are vulnerable to loss and damage [18, 21, 30, 38]. De-
spite this, emerging web services such as e-mail (e.g.,
Gmail), photo sharing (e.g., Snapfish, Ofoto, Shutterfly)1
and archives (e.g., The Internet Archive) require large
volumes of data to be stored indefinitely into the future.
The economic viability of these services depends on stor-
ing the data at very low cost. Customer acceptance of
these services depends on the data remaining both unal-
tered and accessible with low latency.
Satisfying these requirements over long periods of
time would be easy if fast, cheap, reliable disks were
available, and if threats to the data were confined to
the storage subsystem itself. Unfortunately, neither is
true. The economics of high-volume manufacturing pro-
vide a choice between consumer-grade drives, which are
1All trademarks mentioned in this paper belong to their respective
owners.
cheap, fairly fast, and fairly reliable, and enterprise-grade
drives, which are vastly more expensive, much faster but
only a little more reliable. In § 6.1 we show that an en-
terprise drive fourteen times more expensive than a con-
sumer drive only reduces bit errors from 8 to 6 over a
5-year, 99% idle lifetime. For short-lived data, this level
of reliability might not pose a problem, but for long-lived
data these faults are inescapable.
Further, long-term storage faces many threats beyond
the storage system itself. These include obsolescence
of data formats, long-term attacks on the data, and eco-
nomic and structural volatility of organizations sponsor-
ing the storage.
In this paper, we make the case that long-term reli-
able storage is a problem that deserves a fresh look, given
its significant differences from traditional storage prob-
lems addressed in the literature. We start by motivating
the need for digital preservation — storing immutable
data over long periods (§ 2). We then list the threats that
imperil data survival using examples from real systems
(§ 3), and examine why the design philosophy of many
current storage systems is insufficient for long-term stor-
age (§ 4).
To understand the implications of this problem better,
we introduce a simple reliability model (§ 5) of replicated
storage systems designed to address long-term storage
threats. This model is inspired by the reliability model
for RAID [42], but our extensions and interpretation of
the model take a more holistic, end-to-end, rather than
device-oriented, approach. Our model includes a wider
range of faults to which the replicas are subject. It ex-
plicitly incorporates both latent faults, which occur long
before they are detected, and correlated faults, when one
fault causes others or when multiple faults result from the
same error (§ 4). Our model incorporates and highlights
the importance of a detection process for latent faults.
Although our model is simplistic, it highlights needed
areas for gathering reliability data, and it helps evalu-
ate strategies for improving the reliability of systems for
2long-lived data (§ 6). For example, we would like to be
able to answer questions such as, how dangerous are la-
tent faults over long time periods? (Quite dangerous,
§ 5.4.) Would it be better to replicate an archive on
tape or on disk? (Disk, § 6.2.) Is it better to increase
the mean time between visible faults or between latent
faults? (Perhaps neither if it significantly decreases the
other, § 5.4.) Is it better to increase replication in the sys-
tem or increase the independence of existing replicas?
(Both, but replication without increasing independence
does not help much, § 5.5.) Some of these strategies have
been proposed before (§ 7), but we believe they are worth
revisiting in the context of long-term storage.
We conclude (§ 8) that the most important strategies
for increasing reliability of long-term storage are detect-
ing latent faults quickly, automating the repair of faults
to be faster and cheaper, and increasing the independence
of data replicas. This includes increasing geographic,
administrative, organizational, and third-party indepen-
dence, as well as the diversity of hardware and software.
We hope that our analysis and conclusions, while still
primitive, will motivate a renewed look at the design of
storage systems that must preserve data for decades in
volatile and even hostile environments.
2 The Need for Long-term Preservation
Preserving information for decades or even centuries has
proved beneficial in many cases. In the 12th century BC
Shang dynasty Chinese astronomers inscribed eclipse
observations on “oracle bones” (animal bones and tor-
toise shells). About 3200 years later researchers used
these records, together with one from 1302BC, to esti-
mate that the total clock error that had accumulated was
just over 7 hours, and from this derived a value for the
viscosity of the Earth’s mantle as it rebounds from the
weight of the glaciers [41].
Longitudinal studies in the field of medical research
depend upon accurate preservation of detailed patient
records for decades. In 1948 scientists began to study the
residents of Framingham, Massachusetts [13] to under-
stand the large increase in heart disease victims through-
out the 1930s and 40s. Using data collected over decades
of research, scientists discovered the major risk factors
that modern medicine now knows contribute to heart dis-
ease.
In 1975, the former USSR sent two probes, Venera 9
and 10, to the surface of Venus to collect data and pho-
tographs. The resulting photographs were of very low
quality and were relegated to the dustbin of science his-
tory. About 28 years later, an American scientist was
able to use modern digital image processing algorithms
to enhance the photographs to reveal much more detailed
images [60].
These timescales of many decades, even centuries,
contrast with the typical 5-year lifetime for computing
hardware and similar lifetimes attributed to digital me-
dia. It is not just scientific data that is expected to per-
sist over these timescales. Legislation such as Sarbanes-
Oxley [2] and HIPPA [1] require many companies and
organizations to keep electronic records over decades. In
addition, consumers used to analog assets such as mail
and photographs, which persist over many decades, are
now happily entrusting their digital versions to online
services. The associated marketing literature [16] en-
courages them to expect similar longevity.
3 Threats to Long-term Preservation
While traditional short-term storage applications must
also anticipate a variety of threats, the list of threats to
long-term storage is longer and more diverse. Some
threats, such as media and software obsolescence, are
particular to long-term preservation. Other threats, such
as natural disaster and human error, are also threats to
short-term storage applications, but the probability of
their occurrence is higher over the longer desired life-
times for archival data. In this section we list threats
to long-term storage and provide real examples to mo-
tivate them. We take an end-to-end approach in identi-
fying failures, concentrating not just on storage device
faults but also on faults in the environment, processes,
and support surrounding the storage systems.
Large-scale disaster. Large-scale disasters, such as
floods, fires, earthquakes, and acts of war must be an-
ticipated over the long desired lifetimes of archival data.
Such disasters will typically be manifested by other types
of threat, such as media, hardware, and organizational
faults, and sometimes all of these, as was the case with
many of the data centers affected by the 9/11 attack on
the World Trade Center.
Human error. One of the ways in which data are lost
is through users or operators accidentally deleting (or
marking as overwriteable) content they still need, or ac-
cidentally or purposefully deleting data for which they
later discover a need. For instance, rumors suggest
that large professionally administered digital repositories
have suffered administrative errors that caused data loss
across replicas, but the organizations hosting these repos-
itories are unwilling to report the mishaps publicly (see
§ 8). Sometimes the errors instead affect hardware (e.g.,
tapes being lost in transit [46]), software (e.g., unin-
stalling a required driver), or infrastructure (e.g., turning
off the air-conditioning system in the server room) on
which the preservation application runs. Human error is
increasingly the cause of system failures [40, 45].
Component faults. Taking an end-to-end view of a sys-
tem, all components can be expected to fail, including
hardware, software, network interfaces, and even third-
party services. Hardware components suffer transient re-
3coverable faults (e.g., caused by temporary power loss)
and catastrophic irrecoverable faults (e.g., a power surge
fries a controller card). Software components, includ-
ing firmware in disks, suffer from bugs that pose a risk
to the stored data. Systems cannot assume that the net-
work transfers they use to ingest or disseminate content
will terminate within a specified time period, or will ac-
tually deliver the content unaltered. (The initial ingestion
of large collections into a repository is thus itself error-
prone.) Third-party components that cannot easily them-
selves be preserved are also sources of problems. Exter-
nal license servers or the companies that run them might
no longer exist decades after an application and its data
are archived. Domain names will vanish or be reassigned
if the registrant fails to pay the registrar, and a persistent
URL [39] will not resolve if the resolver service fails to
preserve its data with as much care as the storage system
client.
Media faults. The storage medium is a component of
particular interest. No affordable digital storage medium
is completely reliable over long periods of time, since
the medium can degrade; degradation and other such
medium errors can cause irrecoverable bit faults, often
called bit rot. Storage media are also subject to sudden
irrecoverable loss of bulk data from, for instance, disk
crashes [53].
Bit rot is particularly troublesome, because it occurs
without warning and might not be detected until it is too
late to make repairs. The most familiar example might be
CD-ROMs. Studies of CD-ROMs [20, 31] indicate that
despite being sold as reliable for decades, or even 75 to
100 years, they are often only good for two to five years,
even when stored in accordance with the manufacturer’s
recommendations.
Disks are subject to similar problems. For instance, a
previously readable sector can become unreadable. Or a
sector might be readable but contain the wrong informa-
tion due to a previously misplaced sector write, often due
to problems with vibrations [4].
Media/hardware obsolescence. Over time, media and
hardware components can become obsolete — no longer
able to communicate with other system components —
or irreplaceable after a fault. This problem is particu-
larly acute for removable media, which have a long his-
tory of remaining theoretically readable if only a suit-
able reader could be found [25]. Examples include 9-
track tape and 12-inch video laser discs. Evolution of
the industry specification for PCs has made it difficult
to purchase a commodity PC with built-in floppy drive,
indicating that even floppy disks, once considered an ob-
vious ubiquitous cheap storage medium, are endangered.
Software/format obsolescence. Similarly, software
components become obsolete. This is often manifested
as format obsolescence: the bits in which the data were
encoded remain accessible, but the information can no
longer be correctly interpreted. Proprietary formats, even
those in widespread use, are very vulnerable. For in-
stance, digital camera companies have their own propri-
etary “RAW” formats for recording the raw data from
their cameras. These formats are often undocumented,
and when a company ceases to exist or to support its for-
mat, photographers can lose vast amounts of data [54].
Loss of context. Metadata, or more generally “context,”
includes information about layout, location, and inter-
relationships among stored objects, as well as the subject
and provenance of content, and the processes, algorithms
and software needed to manipulate them. Preserving
contextual metadata is as important as preserving the ac-
tual data, and it can even be hard to recognize all required
context in time to collect it. Encrypted information is a
particularly challenging example, since preservation of
the decryption keys is essential alongside preservation of
the encrypted data. Unfortunately, over long periods of
time, secrets (such as decryption keys) tend to get lost,
to leak, or to get broken [14]. This problem is less of
a threat to short-term storage applications, where the as-
sets do not live long enough for the context to be lost or
the information to become uninterpretable.
Attack. Traditional repositories are subject to long-term
malicious attack, and there is no reason to expect their
digital equivalents to be exempt. Attacks include de-
struction, censorship, modification and theft of repos-
itories’ contents, and disruption of their services [55].
The attacks can be short-term or long-term, legal or il-
legal, internal or external. They can be motivated by
ideological, political, financial or legal factors, by brag-
ging rights or by employee dissatisfaction. Attacks are a
threat to short-term storage as well, but researchers usu-
ally focus on short-term, intense attacks, rather than the
slowly subversive attacks that afflict long-term reposito-
ries. Because much abuse of computer systems involves
insiders [24], a digital preservation system must antici-
pate attack even if it is completely isolated from external
networks. Examples of attacks include cases of “saniti-
zation” of US government websites to conform with the
administration’s world view [19, 35].
Organizational faults. A system view of long-term stor-
age must include not merely the technology but also the
organization in which it is embedded. These organiza-
tions can die out, perhaps through bankruptcy, or change
missions. This can deprive the storage technology of the
support it needs to survive. System planning must en-
visage the possibility of the asset represented by the pre-
served content being transferred to a successor organiza-
tion, or otherwise being properly disposed of with a data
“exit strategy.” Storage services can also make mistakes,
and assets dependent on a single service can be lost.
As an example, during an organizational change, a
4large IT company closed a research lab and requested
the lab’s research projects be copied to tape and sent to
another of its labs. Unfortunately, few knew about these
tapes and they were allowed to languish without docu-
mentation of their contents. When it became clear that
some of the project data would be useful to current re-
searchers, enough time had passed that nobody could
identify what would be on which tape, and the volume
of data was too huge to reconstruct an index [28].
As another example, a user lost all of her digital photos
stored at Ofoto when she did not make a purchase within
the required interval and did not receive their email warn-
ings due to having failed to send them her updated email
address [29]. Further, for many of these services there
is no “data exit strategy” for easy bulk retrieval of the
original high-resolution format of all of of the customer’s
photos.
Economic faults. Many organizations with materials to
preserve do not have large budgets to apply to the prob-
lem, and declare success after just managing to get a col-
lection put online. Unfortunately, this provides no plan
for maintaining a collection’s accessibility or quality in
the future. There are ongoing costs for power, cooling,
bandwidth, system administration, equipment space, do-
main registration, renewal of equipment, and so on. In-
formation in digital form is much more vulnerable to
interruptions in the money supply than information on
paper, and budgets for digital preservation must be ex-
pected to vary up and down, possibly even to zero, over
time. These budget issues affect our ability to preserve
as many collections as desired: many libraries now sub-
scribe to fewer serials and monographs [6].
Motivating an investment in preservation can be diffi-
cult [17] without better tools to predict long-term costs,
especially if the target audience for the preserved infor-
mation does not exist at the time decisions are made.
While budget is an issue in the purchase of any storage
system, it is usually easier to plan how money will be
spent over a shorter lifespan.
4 Dangerous Assumptions
Some of the threats above are well-understood and we
should have succeeded in solving these problems by now.
So why do we still lose data? Part of the reason is that our
system designs often fail to take an end-to-end perspec-
tive, and that, in practice, we often make a few key, but
potentially dangerous assumptions. These include vis-
ibility of faults (§ 4.1), independence of faults (§ 4.2),
and enough money to apply exotic solutions (§ 4.3), as
described below.
4.1 The fault visibility assumption
While many faults are detected at the time an error
causes them, some occur silently. These are called “la-
tent faults.” There are many sources of latent faults, but
media errors are the best known. While a head crash
would be detectable, bit rot might not be uncovered until
the affected faulty data are actually accessed and audited.
As another example, a sector on a disk might become un-
readable; this would not be detected until the next read of
that sector. Further, a sector might be readable but con-
tain incorrect information due to a previous misplaced
sector write. Silent media errors and faults occur more
frequently than many of us have assumed; for instance
Schwarz et al. suggest that silent block faults occur five
times as often as whole disk faults [50].
In aggregate, archives such as the Internet Archive
might supply users with data items at a high rate, but
the average data item is accessed infrequently. Detecting
loss or corruption only when a user requests access ren-
ders the average data item vulnerable to an accumulation
of latent faults [23, 34, 50].
While the need to guard against latent faults has long
been recognized in larger systems [8, 23, 50], increases
in storage capacity have recently brought more attention
to the problem for commodity storage. An important ex-
ample is the IRON File System [44], which uses redun-
dancy within a single disk to address latent faults within
file system metadata structures.
Beyond media faults, there are many types of latent
faults caused by threats in § 3:
• Human error: accidental deletion or overwriting of
materials might not be discovered until those mate-
rials are needed.
• Component failure: The reliance on a failed sys-
tem component or a third-party component that is no
longer available might not be discovered until data
depending on that component are accessed.
• Media/hardware obsolescence: Failure of an obso-
lete, seldom-used media reader might not be dis-
covered until information on the associated medium
needs to be read. It might then be impossible or too
costly to purchase another reader.
• Software/format obsolescence: Upon accessing old
information we might discover it is in a format be-
longing to an application we can no longer run.
• Loss of context: We might not discover we are miss-
ing crucial metadata about saved data until we try to
make sense of the data. For instance, we might not
have preserved an encryption key.
• Attack: Results of a successful censorship or cor-
ruption attack on a data repository might never be
discovered, or might only become apparent upon ac-
cessing the data long after the attack.
The general solution to latent faults is to detect them
as quickly as possible, as indicated by our model in § 6.
For instance, “scrubbing” [23, 33, 50] can be used to
detect media faults or evidence of data corruption from
5an attack. If preserving the data is important, scrubbing
should be performed while the data can still be repaired
from a replica (or error correction codes). At a higher
layer, we can prevent latent faults in the making by de-
tecting the need to migrate content from old to new me-
dia or from old to new data formats before we have lost
the ability to read the old medium or interpret the old
data format. Another example is detecting the need to
re-encrypt old materials with new keys before old keys
are considered obsolete.
4.2 The independence assumption
Many researchers and designers correctly point to data
replication as a strategy for preventing data loss, but
make the assumption that replicas fail independently.
Alas, in practice, faults are not as independent as we
might hope. Talagala [53] logged every fault in a large
disk farm (of 368 disk drives) at UC Berkeley over
six months and showed significant correlations between
them. (For example, if power units are shared across
drives, a single power outage can affect a large number of
drives.) A single power outage accounted for 22% of all
machine restarts. Temperature and vibrations of tightly
packed devices in machine room racks [4, 32] are also
sources of correlated media failures.
Taking an end-to-end perspective, there are many
sources of fault correlation corresponding to the threats
in § 3:
• Large-scale disaster: A single large disaster might
destroy all replicas of the data. Geographic repli-
cation clearly helps, but care must be taken to en-
sure it provides sufficient independence. For exam-
ple, in the 2001 9/11 disaster in New York City, a
data center was destroyed. The system failed over to
a replicated data center on the other side of a river,
and the failover worked correctly. Unfortunately, the
sites were still not sufficiently distant; the chaos in
the streets prevented staff from getting to the backup
data center. Eventually it was unable to continue
unattended [56].
• Human error: System administrators are human and
fallible. Unfortunately, in most systems they are also
very powerful, able to destroy or modify data with-
out restriction. If all replicas are under unified ad-
ministrative control, a single human error can cause
faults at all of them.
• Component faults: If all replicas of the information
are dependent on the same external component, for
instance a license server, the loss of that component
causes correlated faults at every replica.
• Loss of context: Losing metadata associated with
archival data might cause correlated faults across
replicas. For instance, if materials are encrypted
with the same key at all replicas, loss of that key will
make all the replicas useless.
• Attack: Attacks can cause correlated faults. For in-
stance, a flash worm might affect many replicas at
once.
• Organizational faults: Long-term storage must an-
ticipate the failure of any one organization or ser-
vice. Increasing the visibility of digital assets and
developing simple exit strategies for data is impor-
tant, but so is minimizing dependence on any single
organization.
As indicated in § 6 by our model, the best way to avoid
correlated faults is independence of the replicas. Simply
increasing the replication is not enough if we do not also
ensure the independence of the replicas geographically,
administratively, and otherwise.
4.3 The unlimited budget assumption
The biggest threats to digital preservation are economic
faults. With a lot of money we could apply many so-
lutions to preserving data, but most of the information
people would like to see live forever is not in the hands
of organizations with unlimited budgets. Solutions such
as synchronous mirroring of RAIDs across widely dis-
persed geographic replicas might not be affordable over
the long term for many organizations. Although we make
a qualitative attempt to compare the costs of some of the
strategies and solutions we explore in this paper, estima-
tion of these costs remains very difficult and is an area
richly deserving further work.
5 Analytic Model
Abstract models such as that in Patterson et al. [42] and
Chen et al.[9] are useful for reasoning about the reliabil-
ity of different replicated storage system designs. In this
section, we build upon these models to further incorpo-
rate the effect of latent and correlated faults on the over-
all reliability of an arbitrary unit of replicated data. Our
model is agnostic to the unit of replication; it can be a bit,
a sector, a file, a disk or an entire storage site. We there-
fore attempt to develop a more abstract model that can
be interpreted in a more general, holistic fashion. While
still coarse-grained, our model is nonetheless helpful for
reasoning about the relative impact of a broader range of
faults, their detection times, their repair times, and their
correlation. The model helps point out what strategies
are most likely to increase reliability, and what data we
need to measure in real systems to resolve tradeoffs be-
tween these strategies.
We start with a simple, abstract definition of latent
faults. We then derive the mean-time-to-failure of mir-
rored data, in the face of both immediately visible and
latent faults. We extend this equation to include the effect
of correlated faults. Finally, we discuss the implications
of this equation for long-term storage.
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Figure 1: Types of replica faults. Time flows from left to right.
At the top, when a visible fault (sad face) is detected, recovery
begins immediately. At the end of successful recovery, the fault
has been corrected (smiley face). At the bottom, when a latent
fault occurs (sad face in sunglasses), nothing happens until the
fault is detected. Once the fault is detected, as with visible
faults, recovery takes place.
5.1 Fault types
We assume that there are two types of faults: immedi-
ately visible and latent, as shown in Figure 1. Visible
faults are those for which the time between their occur-
rence and detection is negligible. Causes of such faults
include entire-disk or controller errors. We denote the
mean time to a visible fault by MV and the associated
mean time to repair by MRV. Latent faults are those
for which the time between occurrence and detection is
significant. Examples include misdirected writes, bit rot,
unreadable sectors, and data stored in obsolete formats.
We denote the mean time to a latent fault by ML and
mean time to repair by MRL. We only consider la-
tent faults that are detectable; hence, they have a finite
mean time between occurrence and detection, denoted
by MDL.
5.2 Assumptions
Our model is based on several assumptions. We build
our model starting from the simplest assumptions and in-
crease its complexity as needed. To start, with no addi-
tional information, the simplest assumption we can make
(as do others [42]) regarding the processes that generate
faults (latent or visible) is that they are memoryless. That
is, the probability, P (t), of a fault occurring within time
t, is independent of the past. This assumption leads to
the following exponential distribution
P (t) = 1− et/MTTF. (1)
where MTTF is the mean time to the fault. For many
parts of our derivation, we consider the case where t <<
MTTF, so the following approximation holds
1− et/MTTF ≈ 1− (1 −
t
MTTF
) =
t
MTTF
. (2)
This approximation and similar ones below are used only
to simplify the expression for the exponential in the prob-
ability, similar to Patterson et al. [43], so are not funda-
mental to the model.
Initially, we also assume that all faults occur indepen-
dently of one another. Subsequently, we revise this as-
sumption by introducing correlated errors that are also
exponentially distributed but with an increased rate of
occurrence. For simplicity, we model this increased rate
via a multiplicative correlation factor, which is assumed
to be the same for both latent and visible faults.
Furthermore, undetectable faults might also exist, but
we ignore them for this analysis. Their effect on the over-
all reliability will dominate only if their rate of occur-
rence is significant. In such a case, we must turn them
into detectable faults, by developing a detection mech-
anism for them, and correct them, by employing redun-
dancy [27]. Otherwise, they will remain the main vulner-
ability for the stored data.
5.3 Reliability
Mirrored data become irrecoverable when there are two
successive faults such that the copy fails before the ini-
tial fault can be repaired, an event we call a double-fault.
Since a double-fault leads to data loss for mirrored repli-
cas, for most of this section, 1
MTTDL
is equal to the rate
of double-fault failures, whereMTTDL is the mean time
to data loss. In this section, we derive an expression for
this quantity, which represents the reliability of mirrored
data, to understand how it is affected by visible, latent,
and correlated faults. Note that the double-fault rate is
meaningful regardless of whether the faults causing those
failures are detected or even detectable. Thus, through-
out this section, our reliability analysis is from the per-
spective of the data rather than the perspective of the user
for whom errors can go unnoticed.
To estimate MTTDL, we first need to estimate the
probability that a second fault will occur while the first
fault is still unrepaired. We refer to this unrepaired pe-
riod as the window of vulnerability (WOV). Since there
are two types of faults, we need to consider the window
of vulnerability after each type, as illustrated in Figure 2.
First, consider the WOV after a visible fault, V1,
which on average is MRV. During this WOV, both latent
and visible faults can occur. The probability that another
visible fault, V2 occurs is
P (V2|V1) =
MRV
MV
(3)
where MRV ≪ MV. We obtain this result by using the
approximation in eqn 2.
The probability that another latent fault, L2 occurs is
P (L2|V1) =
MRV
ML
(4)
where MRV ≪ ML. The difference between P (V2|V1)
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Figure 2: Combinations of double faults resulting in data loss.
The y axis indicates the type of the first fault (first sad face)
and the x axis indicates the type of the second fault (second
sad face). After the first fault occurs, there is a window of vul-
nerability during which the occurrence of a second fault will
lead to data loss. After visible faults, this window only consists
of the recovery period. After latent faults, this window also
includes the time to detect the fault. If correlated, the second
fault is more likely to occur within this window.
and P (L2|V1) arises only from the different rates of fault
occurrence.
Next, consider the WOV after a latent fault, L1,
which on average is MRL + MDL. Again, during this
WOV, both latent and visible faults can occur, and the
difference in the two probabilities of occurrence is sim-
ply due to the different rates of occurrence for visible and
latent faults.
The probability that another visible fault, V2 occurs is
P (V2|L1) =
MDL +MRL
MV
(5)
and the probability that another latent fault, L2, occurs is
P (L2|L1) =
MDL +MRL
ML
(6)
As before, MRL +MDL ≪ MV and MRL +MDL ≪
ML. Note that if MDL becomes large, the equations
do not hold and the combined P (V2|L1) + P (L2|L1) =
P (V2 ∨ L2|L1) approaches 1.
Next, we calculate the total double-fault failure rate
as follows
1
MTTDL
=
P (V2|V1) + P (L2|V1)
MV
+
P (V2|L1) + P (L2|L1)
ML (7)
where the first term on the right side counts the fraction
of the visible faults that result in double-failures, and the
second term counts the fraction of latent faults that result
in double-failures.
To account for correlated faults, we assume that the
probability of the second fault (conditioned on the oc-
currence of the first) is also exponentially distributed,
but with a faster rate parameter. We introduce a multi-
plicative correlation factor α < 1 that reduces the mean
time to the subsequent fault once an initial fault occurs.
In this case, equations 3–6 are multiplied by 1α . This is
undoubtedly a vast simplification of how faults correlate
in practice. Modeling correlations accurately relies on
modeling a particular system instantiation and its com-
ponent interactions, and often is considered a black art.
We are at least not alone in using the simplification [11].
An alternative would be to introduce a distinct MTTF for
correlated faults that is less than the independent MTTF,
as done for RAID by Chen et al. [9].
Combining the previous equations and accounting for
correlated faults, MTTDL becomes
α ·ML2MV2
(MV +ML)(MRV ·ML+ (MRL +MDL) ·MV)
(8)
5.4 Implications
To understand the implications of equation 8, we inves-
tigate its behavior at various operating ranges. We con-
sider the cases in which visible faults are much more fre-
quent than latent faults and vice versa. We also consider
the case in which the WOV after a latent fault occurs is
long. We briefly discuss the implications in each of these
cases and touch upon reliability metrics for higher levels
of redundancy.
First, consider the case in which the visible fault rate
dominates the latent fault rate, {MRL+MDL,MRV} ≪
MV ≪ ML. Then,
MTTDL ≈
α ·MV2
MRV
(9)
because MV +ML ≈ ML and MRV ·ML ≫ (MRL +
MDL) · MV. In this case, the effect of latent faults is
negligible, and thus the equation appropriately resembles
the original RAID reliability model [42].
On the other hand, if the latent fault rate dominates the
visible fault rate, {MRL+MDL,MRV} ≪ ML≪ MV,
then
MTTDL ≈
α ·ML2
MRL+MDL
(10)
because MV+ML ≈MV and MRV ·ML≪ (MRL +
MDL) · MV. Equation 10 indicates that if latent faults
are frequent, we must reduce MDL, as it can negate the
additional ML factor of reliability, a result of replication.
Next, consider the case in which the visible fault rate
dominates, MRV ≪ MV ≪ ML, but latent faults are
8frequent enough to be non-negligible. If the window
of vulnerability after a latent fault occurs is long, then
latent faults still play a role in increasing the double-
fault failure rate. The WOV can be long because ei-
ther the detection time for latent faults is long (MDL ≈
ML), the repair times are long (MRL ≈ ML), or both
(MRL+MDL ≈ ML). In this case, P (V2 ∨L2|L1) ≈ 1
in equation 7, ensuring that a single latent fault is ex-
tremely likely to lead to a double-fault failure. As a re-
sult, the approximation
MTTDL ≈
α ·MV2
MRV + MV
2
ML
(11)
holds when latent faults rates are non-negligible, i.e.
ML < MV2.
These specializations of the model point to four impor-
tant implications. First, in equations 9 and 10, MTTDL
varies quadratically with both MV and ML, and in par-
ticular, with the minimum of MV and ML. Thus, we
must consider occurrence rates for both fault types to
improve overall system reliability. We must be careful
not to sacrifice one for the other, which might happen in
practice, since MV and ML can often be anti-correlated
depending upon hardware choice and detection strategy.
Second, equation 10 indicates that if latent faults are
frequent, it is important to reduce their detection time,
and not just their repair time. More specifically, consider
a Seagate Cheetah disk with a MV of 1.4 × 106 hours,
bandwidth of 300 MB/s, and capacity of 146GB, leading
to MRV of 20 minutes. Following Schwarz et al. [50]),
we assume that latent faults are five times as likely as
visible faults, resulting in an ML of 2.8 × 105 hours.
Without scrubbing, we cannot justify the approximations
leading to equation 10. Therefore, applying equation 7
and substituting P (V2 ∨ L2|L1) ≈ 1, we achieve an
MTTDL = 32.0 years. This gives a 79.0% probability
of data loss in 50 years if we plug it into the exponential
distribution.
On the other hand, if we scrub a replica 3 times a
year, as suggested by Schwarz et al., MDL is 1460 hours
(which is half of the scrubbing period). Then, applying
equation 10, our reliability increases significantly. With
no correlated errors, MTTDL = 6128.7 years, which
gives a 0.8% chance of data loss in 50 years. This implies
that proactive searching for latent faults is appropriate.
Other work agrees with this conclusion [23, 44, 50].
Third, in our model, correlation is a multiplicative fac-
tor and affects the reliability regardless of the type of
fault we have. Continuing with our example above, as-
sume α = 0.1 as suggested by Chen et al. [9]. Then,
MTTDL = 612.9 years, which gives a 7.8% chance of
data loss in 50 years.
The above is a conservative assumption for α because
this correlation factor can vary by several orders of mag-
nitude. To obtain a reasonable lower bound on α, con-
sider that the correlated mean-time-to-second-visible-
fault can be an order of magnitude larger than the re-
covery time; α · MV ≥ 10 · MRV, then α ≥ 10·MRV
MV
.
For example, a bug in the firmware recovery code for a
RAID controller might cause the mean-time-to-second-
fault to be not much more than the mean time to recover.
To obtain a specific lower-bound value, we assume the
same values as above for MV and MRV = MRL, result-
ing in 1 ≥ α ≥ 2× 10−6, which gives a range of at least
5 orders of magnitude.
Fourth, even when latent faults are infrequent, equa-
tion 11 indicates that not attempting to detect latent
faults, or relying on very lengthy recovery procedures
to fix them, will leave the system vulnerable. For ex-
ample, if ML = 1.4 × 107, MV and MRV remain the
same, and α = 0.1, then MTTDL = 159.8 years, lead-
ing to a 26.8% probablility of data loss in 50 years. In
this case, because the system is negligent about handling
latent faults, the data are more susceptible to double-fault
failures from visible and latent faults following an initial
unrepaired latent fault.
5.5 Replication and correlated faults
In this section, we show that additional replication does
not offer much additional reliability without indepen-
dence. To simplify our reliability analysis for higher
degrees of replication, we assume that we have instru-
mented the system so that MDL is negligible, and we
assume that latent and visible faults have similar rates
and repair times. We roughly estimate the MTTDL of
a system with a degree of replication, r, by extending
the analysis along the same lines as for mirrored data.
We calculate the probability that r − 1 successive, com-
pounding faults after an initial fault will leave the system
with no integral copy from which to recover.
To do so, we calculate the probability of r− 1 succes-
sive faults occurring within the vulnerability windows of
each previous fault. For simplicity, this analysis assumes
that the vulnerability windows, each of length MRV,
overlap exactly. In that case, the probability that the k-th
copy fails within the WOV of the previous (k− 1) failed
copies is roughly MRVα·MV . Thus, the probability that suc-
cessive r−1 copies all fail within the WOV of previously
failed copies is the product of those r − 1 probabilities,
( MRVα·MV )
r−1
. Since the first fault occurs with rate 1
MV
, the
overall mean-time-to-data-loss is
MTTDL = MV · (
α ·MV
MRV
)r−1 =
αr−1 ·MVr
MRVr−1
(12)
This equation shows that although increasing the level
of replication, r, geometrically increases MTTDL, a
high degree of correlated errors (α ≪ 1) would also ge-
9ometrically decrease MTTDL, thereby offsetting much
or all of the gains from additional replicas.
6 Strategies
This simple model reveals a number of strategies for re-
ducing the probability of irrecoverable data loss. While
we generally describe them in terms of the more famil-
iar hardware and media faults, they are also applicable
to other kinds of faults. For instance, in addition to de-
tecting faults due to media errors, scrubbing can detect
corruption and data loss due to attack. As another exam-
ple, we can use a similar process of cycling through the
data, albeit at a reduced frequency, to detect data in en-
dangered formats and convert to new formats before we
can no longer interpret the old formats.
• Increase MV by, for example, using storage media
less subject to catastrophic data loss such as disk
head crashes.
• Increase ML by, for example, using storage media
less subject to data corruption, or formats less sub-
ject to obsolescence.
• Reduce MDL by, for example, auditing the data
more frequently to detect latent data faults, as in
RAID scrubbing.
• Reduce MRL by, for example, automatically repair-
ing latent data faults rather than alerting an operator
to do so.
• Reduce MRV by, for example, providing hot spare
drives so that recovery can start immediately rather
than once an operator has replaced a drive.
• Increase the number of replicas enough to survive
more simultaneous faults.
• Increase α by increasing the independence of the
replicas.
In the rest of this section we examine the practical-
ity and costs of some techniques for implementing these
strategies. We provide examples of systems using these
techniques.
6.1 Increase MV or ML
Based on Seagate’s specifications, a 200GB consumer
Barracuda drive has a 7% visible fault probability in a 5-
year service life [51], whereas a 146GB enterprise Chee-
tah has a 3% fault probability [52]. But the Cheetah
costs about 14 times as much per byte2. The Barracuda
has a quoted irrecoverable bit error rate of 10−14 and
the Cheetah of 10−15. Even if the drives spend their 5
year life 99% idle, the Barracuda will suffer about 8 and
the Cheetah about 6 irrecoverable bit errors. This 14-
fold increase in cost between consumer and enterprise
disk drives yields approximately half the probability of
in-service fault and about 3/4 the probability of irrecov-
erable bit fault. Thus, for long-term storage applications
2$8.20/GB versus $0.57/GB. Prices from TigerDirect.com 6/13/05.
whose requirements for latency and individual disk band-
width are minimal, the large incremental cost of enter-
prise drives is hard to justify compared to the smaller in-
cremental cost of more (sufficiently independent) repli-
cas on consumer drives.
6.2 Reduce MDL
A less expensive approach to addressing latent faults due
to media errors is to detect the faults as soon as possible
and repair them. The only way to detect these faults is to
audit the replicas by reading the data and either comput-
ing checksums or comparing against other replicas.
Assuming (unrealistically) that the detection process is
perfect and the latent faults occur randomly, MDL will
be half the interval between audits, so the way to reduce
it is to audit more frequently. Another way to put this
is that one can reduce MDL by devoting more disk read
bandwidth to auditing and less to reading the data; re-
cent work suggests that in many systems we can achieve
a reasonable balance of auditing versus normal system
usage [44, 50].
On-line replicas such as disk copies have significant
advantages over off-line copies such as tape backups, for
two reasons. First, the cost of auditing an off-line copy
includes the cost of retrieving it from storage, mounting
it in a reader, dismounting it and returning it to storage.
This can be considerable, especially if the off-line copy
is in secure off-site storage. Second, on-line media are
designed to be accessed frequently and involve no error-
prone human handling. They can thus be audited with-
out the audit process itself being as significant a cause of
faults (up to some limit, determined in part by the system
strategy for powering components on and off [50]). Au-
diting off-line copies, on the other hand, is a significant
cause of highly correlated faults, from the error-prone
human handling of media [46] to the media degradation
caused by the reading process [3].
The audit strategy is particularly important in the case
of digital preservation systems, where the probability
that an individual data item will ever be accessed by a
user during a disk lifetime is vanishingly small. The sys-
tem cannot depend on user access to trigger fault detec-
tion and recovery, because during the long time between
accesses latent faults will build up enough to swamp re-
covery mechanisms. A system must therefore aggres-
sively audit its replicas to minimizeMDL. The LOCKSS
system is an example of such a system.
Note that relying on off-line replicas for security is not
fool-proof. Off-line storage may reduce the chances of
some attacks, but it may still be vulnerable to insider at-
tacks. Because it is harder to audit, the damage due to
such attacks may persist for longer.
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6.3 Reduce MRL or MRV
Although the mean time to repair a latent media fault will
normally be far less than the mean time to detect it, and
similarly the mean time to repair a visible fault will be far
less than the mean time to its occurrence, reducing the
mean time to repair is nevertheless important in reduc-
ing the window during which the system is vulnerable to
correlated faults.
Again in this case, on-line replicas have the major ad-
vantage that repair times for media faults might be very
short indeed, a few media access times. No human in-
tervention is needed, and the process of repair is in itself
less likely to cause additional correlated faults. Repair-
ing from off-line media incurs the same high costs, long
delays and potential correlated faults as auditing off-line
media.
6.4 Increase replication
Off-line media are the most common approach to in-
creasing replication. But the processes of auditing and
recovering from faults using off-line backup copies can
be slow, expensive, and error-prone.
Some options for disk-based replication strategies in-
clude replication within RAID systems, across RAID
systems, and across simple mirrored replicas. Replica-
tion within RAID systems does not provide geographi-
cal or administrative independence of the replicas. If we
opt for geographic and administrative independence of
replicas, it might be that the extra single-site reliability
provided by RAIDs is not worth the extra cost from a
system-wide perspective. Further, given the cost dispar-
ity between enterprise-grade drives and consumer-grade
drives (see § 1), adding more simple mirrored replicas in
non-RAID configurations might well be a cost-effective
approach to increasing replication and thus overall reli-
ability. OceanStore[26] is an example of using a large
number of replicas on cheap disks.
6.5 Increase independence
In just the six months of the Talagala study [53], many
correlated faults were observed, apparently caused by
disks sharing power, cooling, and SCSI controllers, and
systems sharing network resources. Our model suggests
that in most cases, even with far lower rates of correlated
faults, increasing the independence of replicas is critical
to increasing the reliability of long-term storage.
Long-term storage systems can reduce the probability
of correlated faults by striving for as much diversity as
possible in hardware, software, geographic location, and
administration, and by avoiding dependence on third-
party components and single organizations. Examples
include:
• Hardware: Disks in an array often come from a sin-
gle manufacturing batch. They thus have the same
firmware, same hardware and are the same age, and
so are at the same point in the “bathtub” lifetime
failure curve [15]. However, the increased cost that
would be incurred by giving up supply chain effi-
ciencies of bulk purchase might make hardware di-
versity difficult. Note, though, that replacing all
components of a large archival system at once is
likely to be impossible. If new storage is added in
“rolling procurements” over time [7], then differ-
ences in storage technologies and vendors over time
naturally provides hardware heterogeneity.
• Software: Systems with the same software are vul-
nerable to epidemic failure; Junqiera et al. have stud-
ied how the natural diversity of systems on a campus
can be used to reduce this vulnerability [22]. How-
ever, the increased costs caused by encouraging such
diversity, in terms not merely of purchasing, but also
of training and administration, might again make this
a difficult option for some organizations. The British
Library’s system [7] is unusual in explicitly planning
to develop diversity of both hardware and software
over time. Nevertheless, given the speed with which
malware can find all networked systems sharing a
vulnerability, increasing the diversity of both plat-
form and application software is an effective strategy
for increasing α.
• Geographic location: Many systems using off-line
backup store replicas off-site, despite the additional
storage and handling charges that implies. Digital
preservation systems, such as the British Library’s,
establish each of their on-line replicas in a different
location, again despite the possible increased opera-
tional costs of doing so.
• Administration: Human error is a common cause of
correlated faults among replicas. Again, the British
Library’s system is unusual in ensuring that no sin-
gle administrator will be able to affect more than one
replica. This is probably more effective and more
cost-effective than attempts to implement “dual-key”
administration, in which more than one administra-
tor has to approve each potentially dangerous action.
In a crisis, shared pre-conceptions are likely to cause
both operators to make the same mistake [45].
• Components: System designs should avoid depen-
dence on third-party components that might not
themselves be preserved over time. Determining all
sources of such dependence can be tricky, but some
sources can be detected by running systems in isola-
tion to see what breaks. For example, running a sys-
tem in a network without a domain name service or
certificate authority can determine whether the sys-
tem is dependent on those services. LOCKSS is an
example of a system built to be independent of the
survival of these services.
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• Organization: Taking an end-to-end view of preser-
vation systems, it is also important to support their
organizational independence. For instance, if the im-
portance of a collection extends beyond its current
organization, then there must be an easy and cost-
effective “exit strategy” for the collection if the or-
ganization ceases to exist. As an example, bickering
couples might not want the survival of their babies’
photos to depend on a home IT system whose main-
tenance requires their continued cohabitation.
In summary, the main techniques for increasing the
reliability of long-term storage are replication, indepen-
dence of replicas, auditing replicas to detect latent faults,
and automated recovery to reduce repair times and costs.
6.6 Tradeoffs
Unfortunately, these strategies are not necessarily or-
thogonal, and some can have adverse affects on reliabil-
ity. Here we consider the effects of auditing and auto-
mated recovery. There are many other possible tradeoffs,
such as the costs of increased independence of adminis-
trative domains and diversity of hardware and software
that we do not cover here.
Auditing is necessary for detecting latent faults, but as
previously described, it increases the frequency of me-
dia access, which might increase both visible and la-
tent media errors and costs due to increased consump-
tion of power and other system and administrative re-
sources. Previous work [23, 44, 50] suggests it is pos-
sible to achieve an appropriate balance that increases re-
liability considerably while performing much of the audit
work in background, even opportunistically when legiti-
mate data accesses require powering on the correspond-
ing system components.
Unfortunately, the audit process can itself introduce
other channels for data corruption. An example would be
attacking a distributed system through the audit protocol
itself [33], which therefore must be designed as carefully
as any other distributed protocol.
While automated recovery can reduce costs and speed
up recovery times, if buggy or compromised by an at-
tacker, it can itself introduce latent faults. This can be
dangerous because even visible faults can now (though
seemingly having been recovered) turn into latent ones.
6.7 Data gathering
Our simple model of reliability of replicated storage
points out areas where we are in great need of further
data to validate the model and to evaluate the potential
utility of the reliability strategies described in this paper.
In particular, there is very little published about the types
and distribution of latent faults, both due to media errors
and also due to the other threats we describe. Moreover,
the correlations that result in latent faults are poorly un-
derstood.
One desirable application of the model would be
choosing, for instance, between two levels of replication
and audit. Assume that for disaster tolerance we have
two geographically independent replica systems. Would
it be better for each system to audit its storage internally?
Or would it be better to audit between the two replicas?
Answering such a question requires understanding, at a
minimum: the MTTF of both visible and latent faults,
the MDL of different audit strategies, the recovery strate-
gies, the costs of replicating information internally and
geographically, and the costs of auditing internally ver-
sus between sites.
To gather this information we can instrument existing
systems. For a start, we can log occurrences of visible
faults, detection of latent faults, and occurrences of data
loss. One approach for detecting latent faults is to cy-
cle proactively through the storage logging checksums
of immutable objects. Ideally, these fault occurrences
would include timestamps and vertical information about
the location of the fault: block, sector, disk, file, appli-
cation, etc. We would use such information to determine
the distributions and rates of the faults that we consider,
thereby testing the validity of our assumptions. Addi-
tionally, we can log information about recovery proce-
dures performed (e.g., replacement of disks or recovery
from tape), their duration, and outcomes. We could use
such data to measure mean recovery times and, combined
with the previous information, validate the model itself.
We could employ metadata about the configuration: me-
dia, hardware, software, etc., to estimate costs. Finally,
we could log SMART data from disks, and external in-
formation such as application workloads offered, pro-
cesses spawned, file system and network statistics, and
administrator changes. We could mine such information
to identify and perform root cause analysis for correlated
faults.
Efforts are underway to gather some of this informa-
tion for existing systems. For instance, several groups at
UC Santa Cruz, HP Labs and elsewhere have been pro-
cessing just such failure data from large archives such as
the Internet Archive. We need information, though, from
many different kinds of storage systems with different
replication architectures.
7 Related Work
In this section we review related work, showing how oth-
ers address problems, such as correlated and latent faults,
that arise when large amounts of data must remain unal-
tered yet accessible with low latency at low cost. We
start with low-level approaches that focus on single de-
vices and RAID arrays, then move up the stack.
Evidence of correlated faults comes from studies of
disk farms. Talagala [53] logs every fault in a large disk
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farm (of 368 disk drives) at UC Berkeley over six months
and shows significant correlations between them. The
study focuses primarily on media (drive failures), power
failures, and system software/dependency failures.
Chen et al. [9] explore the tradeoffs between perfor-
mance and reliability in RAID systems, noting that sys-
tem crashes (i.e., correlated faults) and uncorrectable bit
errors (i.e., latent faults) can greatly reduce the reliability
predicted in the original RAID paper [42]. Kari’s disser-
tation [23] appears to be the first comprehensive analysis
of latent disk failures. His model also shows that they
can greatly reduce the reliability of RAID systems, and
presents four scrubbing algorithms that adapt to disk ac-
tivity, using idle time to flush out latent errors. In con-
trast, we explore a broader space that includes applica-
tion faults and distributed replication.
Enterprise storage systems have recognized the need
to address latent and correlated faults. Network Appli-
ance’s storage threat model includes two whole-disk fail-
ures, and a whole-disk failure with a latent fault discov-
ered during recovery (our P (L2|V1)). They employ row-
diagonal parity and suggest periodic scrubbing of disks
to improve reliability [11]. Schwarz et al. [50] show that
opportunistic scrubbing, piggy-backed on other disk ac-
tivity, performs very well. Like us, they do not depend
on the disk to detect a latent fault but actually check the
data. Our exploration also includes higher-layer failures.
Database vendors have implemented some
application-level techniques to detect corruption.
DB2’s threat model includes a failure to write a database
page spanning multiple sectors atomically. It sprinkles
page consistency bits through each page, modifying and
checking them on each read and write. These bits detect
some other forms of corruption but only those affecting
the consistency bits [36]. Tandem NonStop systems
write checksums to disk with the data, and compare
them when data are read back [8].
The IRON File System [44] is a file system whose
threat model includes latent faults and silent corruption
of the disk. It protects the file system’s metadata (but not
the data) using checksums and in-disk replication.
An alternative to tightly-coupled replication such as
RAID is more loosely-coupled distributed replication.
In 1990 Saltzer suggested that digital archives need ge-
ographically distributed replicas to survive natural dis-
asters, that they must proactively migrate to new media
to survive media obsolescence, and that heavy-duty for-
ward error correction could correct corruption that can
accumulate when data are rarely accessed [49]. More
recently, these ideas inform the design of the British Li-
brary’s digital archive [7].
Many distributed peer-to-peer storage architectures
have been proposed to provide highly-available and
persistent storage services, including the Eternity Ser-
vice [5], Intermemory [10], CFS [12], OceanStore [26],
PAST [48], and Tangler [57]. Their threat models vary,
but include powerful adversaries (Eternity Service) and
multiple failures. Some (OceanStore) use cryptographic
sharing to proliferate n partial replicas from any m < n
of which they can recover the data. Others (PAST) repli-
cate whole files. Weatherspoon’s [58] model compares
the reliability of these approaches. While the model it-
self does not include latent errors, correlated errors, or
others such as operational or human errors, it takes into
account the storage and bandwidth requirements of each
approach. Later work [59] identifies correlations among
replicas (e.g., geographic or administrative) and informs
the replication policy to reduce correlation effects.
Deep Store [61] and the LOCKSS system [33] share
the belief that preserving large amounts of data for long
periods affordably is a major design challenge. Deep
Store addresses the cost issues by eliminating redun-
dancy, LOCKSS by using a “network appliance” ap-
proach to reducing system administration [47], and large
numbers of loosely coupled replicas on low-cost hard-
ware. Both recognize the threats of “bit rot” and format
obsolescence to long-term preservation.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we motivate the need for long-term storage
of digital information and examine the threats to such
information. Using an extended reliability model that in-
corporates latent faults, correlated faults, and the detec-
tion time of latent faults, we reason about possible strate-
gies for improving long-term reliability of these systems.
The cost of these strategies is important, since limited
budget is one of the key threats to digital preservation.
We find that the most important strategies are auditing to
detect latent faults as soon as possible, automating repair
so that it is as fast, cheap, and as reliable as possible, and
increasing the independence of data replicas.
This is clearly a work in progress. We do not yet
have data to characterize all the terms in our model. The
model thus points to several data collection projects that
would be very useful. For instance, we need more data
on the mean time to different types of latent faults, the
repair times for faults once detected, and the levels of
correlation of different kinds of faults. We are currently
seeking out sources of these data and instrumenting sys-
tems to gather more.
A digital preservation system should rarely suffer in-
cidents that could cause data loss. Thus the total expe-
rience base available to designers of such systems will
grow very slowly with time, making it difficult to iden-
tify and fix the problems that will undoubtedly arise. Past
incidents indicate that it will in practice be very diffi-
cult to accumulate this experience base. The host or-
ganization’s typical response to an incident causing data
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loss is to cover it up. A few details become known via
the grapevine, but the true story never becomes part of
the experience base. A system similar to NASA’s Avia-
tion Safety Reporting System [37] should be established,
through which operators of storage systems could submit
reports of incidents, even those not resulting in data loss,
for others to read in anonymized form and from which
they can learn how to improve the reliability of their own
systems.
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